Introduction
It is well known [Green (1977) ] that an assumption of identical homothetic preferences in standard Walrasian general equilibrium contexts is essentially both necessary and sufficient for aggregate consumption to be invariant with respect to redistributions of income across agents. models based on rational individual behavior has previously been stressed by a variety of researchers, e.g. Balasko and Shell (1981a, b) , Brock and Scheinkman (1980) , Cass and Shell (1980) Lucas (1980) , Lucas and Sargent (1979) , Sargent and Wallace (1976) , and Wallace (1980a, b) . However, in contrast to the present paper, most of these studies focus on the effectiveness of government monetary transfer policy for ensuring the existence of Pareto optimal outcomes in economies with perfect borrowing and lending. The fiat money price of a two-period bond at each time t is denoted by PB, and the price of a two-period bond at each time t in units of time t consumption is denoted by pB-PB/P. The two-period rate of interest on bonds at each time t is thus given by is [l -P"]/P'. For simplicity, the model conditions will henceforth be expressed in terms of i and pB rather than P and PB.
The model
For each k = 1,2 and each time t, the planning problem of a type k young agent is assumed to be the choice of a consumption profile ck =(c:, ci, c,$ a money holding profile M,- (ML, Mi) , and a two-period bond purchase (B,zO) or sale (B, <0) when young, to maximize utility of consumption subject to the budget constraints c;+(l+i)pBM:+pBB,=[l-T]w:, Fig. 1 is intuitively reasonable, reflecting the desire of young agents to smooth out their endowment profiles. Fig. 1 would presumably retain its qualitative appearance even for more general utility functions. Before presenting the government budget constraint and market clearing conditions for this model, certain compact notations will be introduced for describing aggregates.
Notational conventions
Let denote the vector of population sizes, endowments, and social security benefits, respectively, for agent types 1 and 2, and let c E (c:, c:, c:, c:, c;, c:, 3 (c,, c,) , denote the vector of money holdings, bond holdings, and consumption levels, respectively, for agent types 1 and 2. Note, by stationarity, that aggregating endowments across a generation also yields aggregate endowments at each time t, and similarly for consumption, money and bond holdings, and social 'In Martins (1980) a special case of the young generation planning problem (I) is examined under the maintained hypothesis M: > 0 and M: = 0, and for parameter restrictions 0: > 0, t( = b = 1, and ui=S,= T=O. The basic conclusion of Martins' study (1980, p. 181) is that the bond rate of interest i is given by the bonds/money ratio minus one, i.e. i= B,/M:-1. Substituting Martins' parameter restrictions into (I), it can be shown that the optimal solution does satisfy this relation. However, Martins Similarly, the following notational conventions will be used to denote the indicated consumption, money, bond, and social security benefit aggregates at each time t: Using these notational conventions, the government budget constraint at each time t is given by
the goods market clearing condition at each time t is given by NC = Nw; and the bond market clearing condition at each time t is given by NB=i?.
Finally, the money market clearing condition at each time t is given by
(2)
Clearly (5) holds if (2) and (4) hold. Moreover, the cross-sectional budget constraints for young, middle-aged, and old agents at each time t together with (3) and (4) can be shown to imply (2); hence, both (2) and (5) Nikaido (1968, pp. 305-307, 335) ]. In a log-linear two-period overlapping generations model with fiat money and perfect borrowing and lending, Balasko and Shell (1981b) 
Distributional effects
The present section uses the theorems of appendix A to explore the sensitivity of equilibria to parameter variations, with particular emphasis on variations in distribution which leave aggregate levels unchanged. In contrast to results obtained for standard log-linear Walrasian models, it is shown that macro equilibria for the present log-linear overlapping generations model are invariant with respect to redistributions in endowments and social security benefits if and only if all agents exhibit suitably similar liquidity preference behavior prior to redistribution.
The first theorem below establishes the neutrality of equilibria with respect to certain fixed-proportion
variations. These results demonstrate that various normalizations could have been incorporated without loss of generality into the definition of an economy if existence had been the only question at issue.
Theorem 4.1. (Neutrality with respect to fixed-proportion variations).
Let an economy e = (N, w, CC, fl, S, 7: BJ be given, and let (p", i, M, B, c) be an equilibrium for e. Then the following assertions hold.
1. Money neutrality: (I.-'$', i, AM, AB, c) is an equilibrium for e,= (N, w, a, fi, AS, 7: 397) for every A>O. 2. Endowment neutrality: (BP', i, M, B, &) is an equilibrium for e,= (N, 80, a, p, S, 7: B) for every O>O. 3. Population neutrality: (p", i, M, B, c) is an equilibrium for ed = (6N, w, a, b', S, 7; 6B) for every 6 > 0.
Precise definitions
will now be given for distributional variation and related concepts.
Definitions
Let an economy e =(N, w, c(, p, S, 7; B) be given. Any change in the endowment and social security benefit vector (w,S) to some new vector (w', S') which leaves the aggregate endowment and benefit levels Nw and NS unchanged, and for which the resulting vector of parameters e' =(N, o', LX, /I, S', IT: B) is an economy, will be called a fig. 3 .4
Theorem 4.3. (Existence and distribution neutrality with youth endowments only). Let an economy e=(N, w, ~1, 8, S, 7; B) be given for which No' >O, No2 = 0, and TNS > 0.

Zf (B+ NS)T<PNS/(l +a + j?), there exist infinitely many equilibria for e; and if (B+ NS)T= jNS/(l +cc+ /I'), there exists a unique equilibrium for e.
For all such equilibria, i=O and Mj > Mi, k = 1,2.
Zf (B+ NS)T> /INS/(1 + CI + j3) there exists a unique equilibrium for e, with i>O and (Mk >O, Mi=O), k= 1,2. Given any equilibrium (p", i, M, B, c) for e, the real price of bonds pB, bond interest rate i, and aggregate consumption und money holding profiles (NC', NC', Nc3) and (NM', NM2) are independent of ull distributional variations in S and (o:, co:), both local and global.
The analysis of economies with positive youth endowments and zero middle-age endowments is much simpler than the analysis of economies with zero youth endowments and positive middle-age endowments. The technical difficulty in the latter case is that the interest rate i in theorem 3.8 cannot be represented in a convenient analytical form, resulting in a region described 4The precise derivation of fig. 3 and the ensuing figs. 4-6 is as follows, First, consider the stratification induced on the space r of all economies e by the stratitication of competitive equilibria in accordance with distinct liquidity preference behavior, as characterized by theorems 3.1-3.8. Next, consider that stratified subset of t compatible with the additional specified parameter restrictions (e.g. NW' >O, NW' =O, and f??tO for fig. 3 ). Finally. project this stratified subset of 5 onto the specified two-dimensional subspace (e.g. NS-T space for fig. 3 ). Each region number in the resulting two-dimensional stratification (e.g. 3.2 and 3.3 in fig. 3 ) refers to the particular section 3 existence theorem giving the analytical characterization of the region in terms of primitive parameter restrictions. Note that i>O in each region unless otherwise indicated. by quartic inequalities.
The relatively less tractable nature of the equilibria described by theorem 3.8 is perhaps not surprising, since the hypotheses of theorem 3.8 define the set of economies for which agent types 1 and 2 exhibit the least similar liquidity preference behavior, i.e. (Mi =O, Mf >O) versus (M; > 0, M; = 0).
As the following theorem demonstrates, it is nevertheless still possible to determine a general necessary condition for existence for the case of zero youth endowments and positive middle-age endowments. Specifically, government must buy bonds from young agents in each period t (i.e. BSO), and the amount of such bonds must exceed the aggregate level NS of social security benefits distributed to old agents in each period t by a factor of (1 +/I). Thus, unlike the case of positive youth endowments and zero middleage endowments treated in theorem 4.3, government is unable to set aggregate social security benefits at arbitrarily high levels without destroying stationary equilibrium.
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Theorem 4.4. (Existence region with middle-age endowments only). Let an economy e=(N, w, SI, p, S, 7; B) be given with No' =0 and No2 >O. Then a necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium for e is
Remark. Condition (6) is not sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium for e, as can be seen by considering the special case N, = N, = 1, 0: = 0: = 0, o~=w~>O, cz=fi=l, S,=O, S,=1.75, T=1/2, and B=-1.
An example is depicted in fig. 4 . All regions apart from A and A* can be determined analytically. It can also be analytically established that each point in A or A* is either a point of nonexistence, or a point satisfying the conditions of theorem 3.8 or its symmetrical counterpart 3.8* respectively. (A numerical search of region A revealed no points satisfying the hypotheses of theorem 3.8.) The general geometric configuration of the liquidity preference regions depicted in fig. 4 is intuitively reasonable:
given No' =O, young agents must sell two-period bonds to finance their consumption. They will therefore plan to carry over money from middle to old age to help repay their debts, unless their old-age security benefits are sufficiently large.
As the following theorem 4.5 demonstrates, active government intervention in the economy is necessary for the existence of equilibria only in the case of zero youth endowments.
Theorem 4.5 is illustrated in fig. 5 . Suppose government now considers the provision of social security benefits to type 1 agents only, i.e. S, 2 0 and S, =O. How does the set of equilibria vary as a function of S,?
To examine this question, consider a zero net aggregate bond economy e =(N, o, CC, /?, S, T, 0) for which complete symmetry prevails apart from the levels set for S, and S,, i.e. N, = N,, 0: = W; -6, and 0: = C$ E G. By theorem 4.1 (endowment neutrality), the normalization 6 = 1 -0, 0 5 0 5 1, can be imposed on e without loss of generality.
By theorem 4.1 (money neutrality), an equilibrium exists for e if and only if it exists for e, =(N, w, c(, /I, IS, 7: 0) for all 2 > 0, and the corresponding equilibrium real present value pBANS of social security benefits is independent of 2. The following theorem 4.6 establishes a stronger existence and S,-neutrality result for e. Briefly, an equilibrium exists for e if and only if S, >O, and the number of equilibria corresponding to e is independent of S, over R,,. Part 2 of theorem 4.6 is depicted in fig. 6 . The points F, G, and I are given bY I= ( Note that all indicated partition points in fig. 6 are independent of S,, illustrating the surprising fact that agent liquidity preference behavior is qualitatively invariant with respect to the magnitude of the nominal social security benefits S, allocated to the favored type 1 agent as long as these benefits are positive. (N, w, a, b, 7; B) , there exists no equilibrium (pB, i, M, B, c) .
Appendix A: Section 3. Existence and uniqueness theorems
for e such that i>O and either (M: >O, M: >0) or (M;>O, M;>O). Theorem 3.2. (Zero interest rate equilibria).
Let an economy e= (N, W, r, t$ S, 7 : B) be given. 
If 0 < TNS, there exists u zero interest rute equilibrium (p", 0, M, B, c) for
Theorem 3.3. (Equilibriu with youth money holding only).
Let an economy e = (N, oj, c(, p, S, 7 ; l?) be given. There exists an equilibrium (p', i, M, B, c) .for Given existence, the equilibrium is unique.
Theorem 3.4. (Equilibria with zero money holding). Let an economy e=(N, Q, CC, /I, S, 7; B) be given. Define
D = (1 + p)B+ NS.
If D +O, there exists an equilibrium (p", i, M, B, c) for e satisfying i > 0 and (M: =O, Mf=O), k= 1,2, ifand only if
Given existence, the equilibrium is unique.
If D=O, No'=O, and 0<crSkTNw2-flNS[l-T]o&
k=l,2, then any value p > 0 satisfying
as, ' Cd,NS 
V=[(a+f?)B+(B+NS)T]No'-[(cc+f3)BT+(B+NS)]No2,
the quadratic roots i defined by (A4) are real. It follows by Descartes' rule of signs (for polynomials with real roots) that the number of positive solutions i for (A4) is precisely equal to the number of successive sign changes in the nonzero coefficients of
for the existence of a unique positive value i satisfying (A4) is thus, for example, NS= 0, TNw' >O, and B# 0; for then X and 
(Equilibria with weakly dissimilar youth money holding).
Let an economy e= (N, co, a, f?, S, 7 ; BJ be given. There exists an equilibrium (pB, i, M, B, c) 
TNo-pBNS '= pB[B+ NS]
Remark.
Theorem 3.6 with the roles of agent types 1 and 2 interchanged will be referred to as theorem 3.6*. and LN, oz 5 [ctN, w~] N,o& then any value p>O yields an equilibrium price pB =p for e with i= [(l+f3)N,o:-L] /L>O, (Mi=O, M:>O) , and (Ma=O, M$ = 0).
No equilibria satisfying i>O, (M: =O, M: >O), and (Mi =O, MZ =0) exist
for e otherwise.
As in the remark following the statement of theorem 3.5, a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique positive value i satisfying (A7) is Yz 24XZ, NS=O, TNo' >O, and s#O. The nonvacuity of theorem 3.7 is established in section 4. The statement of theorem 3.7 with the roles of agent types 1 and 2 interchanged will be referred to as theorem 3.7*. Since Y=X+Z+RTNo+NS [l-T] [N,o:-K] , it follows, as in the remarks following theorems 3.5 and 3.7, that a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique positive value i satisfying (AlO) is Y2 14XZ, NS =O, TK > 0, and B#O. The nonvacuity of theorem 3.8 is established in section 4. The statement of theorem 3.8 with the roles of agent types 1 and 2 interchanged will be referred to as theorem 3.8*.
Appendix B: Proof outlines
Proof of theorems 3. 1-3.8. For each k = 1,2, the young agent planning problem (1) is a concave programming problem subject to linear constraints. The following Kuhn-Tucker conditions (KT) are thus both necessary and sufficient for a solution for any given pB>O and i>O:
(KT) There exists a vector (Mk, B,, ck) in R2 x R x R: + and a vector (,I, 0) in R: satisfying pB [M~-M:] +/I =o,
-PB P( 1 + i)P" (1 +B)pB PB
of the Jacobian for system (B9) is nonzero, it can be shown that the unique solution for system (B9) is
@lo)
M:=[ip"]+T][m:+&]+p"s,).
However, the only consumption vector ck satisfying eqs. (Bl) through (B3) for the bond and money holding values (BlO) is the zero vector. This establishes theorem 3.1.
The proofs of theorems 3.3 through 3.8 are analogous to the proof of theorem 3.1. One first uses (KT) to find necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions to the young agent planning problem (1) having the stated liquidity preference characteristics, together with the precise form of these solutions, for any given real bond price pB>O and bond interest rate i>O. One then obtains necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of positive values pB and i consistent with both the solution forms and the market clearing conditions (3) and (4). Theorem 3.2 is proved similarly, after a change of variables E, = B, + Ml and F, = B, + Mi. Q.E.D. Proof of corollary 3.2.1. Suppose conditions (Al) hold with strict inequality for some economy e* E R!+'+ x (0,l) x R -{0} and some point where B* is the last component of e *. Then e* has infinitely many equilibria, since conditions (Al) continue to hold in some R2 neighborhood I/* of (By, @) intersected with &?*, and each point in V* n W corresponds to a distinct equilibrium for e*. On the other hand, for sufficiently small 6* >O, each vector of the form ed* = Se* ) l6-11<6*,
is an economy for which conditions (Al) also hold with strict inequality, with (SST, 6@) in place of (BT, B,*); hence, each economy (Bll) also has infinitely many equilibria. It follows that {e$) 16 -1) <S*} is an open rectangle of economies in R12 with Lebesgue measure (2~5,)'~ >O such that each element eZ has infinitely many equilibria.
It thus suffices to exhibit an economy e* and point (@, @) satisfying the required conditions. Such a pair is given by e* -(N*, w*, c(*, /I*, S*, T*, B*) and (BT,@)=(-*, -$, where N*=(l,l), o*=(l,l,l,l), cr*=l, b*=l, S* =(l, l), T*=1/4, and B*= -1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of theorem 4.1. Using theorems 3.2 through 3.8, together with a symmetry argument to handle cases not explicitly covered, it can be verified that the necessary and sufficient conditions defining the various liquidity preference regions are satisfied by e and (pB, i, M, B, c) if and only if they are satisfied by e, and (lP1pB, i, AM, AB, c) for A>O, where (il-'p', i, AM, AB, c) has the proper solution form. Thus, money neutrality holds, as claimed in part 1. The endowment and population neutrality properties claimed in parts 2 and 3 are similarly established.
Proof of theorem 4.2. The proof of part 1 follows from theorem 3.2. Specifically, one has i = 0, NC' = NW/( 1 + CY +/I), NC' = CYNC', Nc3 = PNc', and p*= TNo/NS for all distributional variations in o and S for which the necessary conditions (Al) for i=O remain satisfied; and for all distributional variations in S for which conditions (Al) remain satisfied.
The sufficiency direction in part 2 follows from theorem 3.3 in the manner of part 1, above, noting that conditions (A2) are in strict inequality form, and hence hold over a variational neighborhood of S if they hold at S. 
(BW 
It can be shown that (B17) is less than or equal to the right-hand side of (B13) for k= 1 if and only if (B14) holds.
Conditions
(B12) and (B13) are therefore equivalent to (B14). It follows that condition (B14) is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a zero interest rate equilibrium for e. Since each distinct pair of values (B,, B,) yields a distinct zero interest rate equilibrium, infinitely many exist if (B14) holds with strict inequality and a unique one exists [corresponding to By and i?T in (B15) and (B16)] if (B14) holds with equality.
Finally, it can be verified from the form of the solution in theorem 3.2 that ML > Mt, k= 1,2, for any zero interest rate equilibrium for e. Concerning part 2, it follows from theorem 3.3 that a unique equilibrium exists for e satisfying i > 0 and (M: > 0, Mz = 0), k = 1,2, if and only if PNS/( 1 +m+B)<(L?+NS)'L Moreover, it can be verified that no other equilibria exist for e with i> 0, since Nm2 =0 violates the basic necessary and sufficient conditions for existence in theorems 3.4 through 3.8, and also in the symmetrical counterpart theorems 3.6* through 3.8*. Thus, parts 1 and 2 are established, and part 3 is then a direct corollary of theorem 4.2. Q.E.D. 
Multiplying through (B18) by N, and aggregating with respect to k yields condition (6). If TNS=O, then, by theorem 3.2, existence with i=O requires T = NS =0 and B<O, i.e. O<(l +/?)[ -Rj, so again condition (6) holds.
In similar fashion, it can be shown that the necessary conditions for existence given in theorems 3.3 through 3.8 and their symmetrical counterparts imply the satisfaction of condition (6). Q.E.D. By symmetry, there are two more regions of existence corresponding to cases 3 and 4 (theorems 3.7* and 3.8*) with the roles of agent types 1 and 2 interchanged.
It can then be shown that, for each fixed set of values for N, o:, oi, a, and /j' with Nor >O, conditions 1 through 5 define a partition of (of, &)-space, as depicted in fig. 5 . None of the conditions 1 through 5 is satisfied if NW' =O, an intuitively predictable result; for both agent types would need to borrow (sell bonds) in period 1 in this case, which is incompatible with B =O. Q.E.D. 
